



General Assembly Security Council

Distr.: General
18 March 2002

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 43

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001, paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 56/220 A of 21 December 2001 and as a follow-up to my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154).

2. The United Nations has long been engaged in Afghanistan. In recent years we have been trying on the one hand to bring an end to the inter-Afghan fighting that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and on the other hand delivering much-needed humanitarian assistance to a large number of Afghan men, women and children, both inside Afghanistan and in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. At the time the Bonn Conference was convened in November 2001, United Nations political and mediation activities were carried out by the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSM). United Nations humanitarian and development activities, conducted by its agencies, funds and programmes were coordinated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan. For security reasons, all international United Nations personnel were withdrawn from Afghanistan in September 2001. From September to

November, they managed emergency activities from Islamabad, where many of them had maintained a base of operations for Afghanistan for a number of years.

4. On 5 December, the Bonn Conference concluded successfully. Under cover of my letter dated the same day, the members of the Security Council received the text of the "Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions" (Bonn Agreement), which had been signed in Bonn on that date (S/2001/1154).

5. In its resolution 1383 (2001), adopted the following day, the Security Council endorsed the Bonn Agreement; called for full commitment by all Afghan groups to the Agreement's implementation; and declared its willingness to take further action, on the basis of a report of the Secretary-General, to support the interim institutions established in the Agreement, as well as the implementation of the Agreement and its annexes.

6. The present report summarizes the key developments in Afghanistan since the signing of the Bonn Agreement. It also proposes a structure for the United Nations presence in Afghanistan in accordance with its responsibilities under the Bonn Agreement, taking into account current political, security and humanitarian conditions in the country.

II. Status of implementation of the Bonn Agreement: establishment of the Interim Administration and key commissions

A. Context

7. The Bonn Agreement represents a historic opportunity for the people of Afghanistan to emerge from a cycle of conflict and devastating poverty into a future in which there can be reconstruction and peaceful development. The Agreement was reached under extraordinary circumstances. Inevitably, the exigencies of the process resulted in a less than fully representative selection of delegates for the talks and for selection of the members of the Interim Administration.

8. The implementation period of the Bonn Agreement is envisaged to last for two to three years, and is intended to lead to a full-fledged government, chosen freely by the entire electorate of Afghanistan. The Interim Authority chosen at Bonn is to be succeeded by a Transitional Authority, selected through an emergency *loya jirga* that is to convene within six months of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The participants in the *loya jirga* are to be drawn from all segments of society, and the representation of women and all ethnic and religious communities is to be ensured. The Transitional Authority is to lead Afghanistan until a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections, which are to be held no later than two years after the date of the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*. A constitutional *loya jirga* to ratify a new constitution is to convene within 18 months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority.

9. Major difficulties had to be overcome during the Bonn Conference, with the various parties questioning the degree to which the other adequately represented the entire population of Afghanistan. These mutual suspicions and accusations did not fully disappear with the establishment of the Interim Administration. They are explained by the fact that the members of the Interim Administration were not a cohesive group at the time of their inauguration, nor, for all intents and purposes, are they today. This lack of cohesion continues to exacerbate tensions when incidents occur, such as the assassination on 14 February of Abdul

Rahman, the Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism. The situation is further compounded by the unsettled political conditions that still prevail in the south and east of the country. The international coalition's continuing military campaign against terrorism is occurring in parallel with great tension, and sometimes fighting, between Pashtun political and tribal leaders who are competing for predominance in their respective communities. In addition, vehement protests persist that Pashtuns are grossly underrepresented in all official institutions, especially in the security sector.

10. Notwithstanding the original criticisms concerning the ethnic and political imbalance perceived in the Interim Administration from the outset and the persistence of uneasiness within and around it, the reaction to the signing of the Bonn Agreement was largely positive in Afghanistan, for two main reasons. First, the majority of the population — exhausted, impoverished and desperately yearning for peace — recognized that a unique opportunity presented itself for the country finally to start down the path to peace and sustainable development, after more than 23 years of war. It was an opportunity that might not present itself again, and therefore could not be squandered. Second, many noted that the Bonn Agreement allowed for progressively more representative forms of government through a three-stage process. This process is now well and truly under way.

B. Establishment of the Interim Administration

11. Against this backdrop of both criticism and hope, the Interim Authority was established on 22 December 2001, as prescribed by the Bonn Agreement. Hamid Karzai was sworn in as Chairman of the Interim Administration, as were the Vice-Chairpersons and all other heads of departments in the Interim Administration. The ceremony was held in an atmosphere of national unity. Leaders of the existing factions and representatives from all 32 provinces in the country participated in the event, together with a large number of foreign guests, including, in particular, representatives of all of Afghanistan's neighbours, the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations. Outgoing President Burhannudin Rabbani stated at the inaugural ceremony that such a peaceful transfer of power had "no precedence in our troubled society for centuries".

12. The day after he was sworn in as Chairman of the Interim Administration, on 23 December, Mr. Karzai convened its first cabinet meeting. He met thereafter with Lakhdar Brahimi, my Special Representative for Afghanistan, and sought United Nations assistance in a broad range of areas in order to facilitate the work of the Interim Administration. At its inception, the Interim Administration had no funds of its own, yet it faced the daunting task of finding buildings to house a number of newly established departments, including the newly created Ministry of Women's Affairs, and procuring basic office furniture and equipment to enable departmental staff to begin working. In addition, the Interim Administration had no means of paying the salaries of its new members, let alone of the civil servants at all levels who had not been paid for five to six months. Despite these formidable hurdles, the Interim Administration has managed to make progress in a number of areas, concretely as well as symbolically, domestically as well as internationally.

13. During its first two weeks, the members of the Cabinet conducted a consultative process to establish an initial policy framework and a consensus on its immediate priorities. This resulted in a vision for Afghanistan's development that Mr. Karzai presented in a speech to the international community at the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo in January 2002.

14. Subsequently, the Interim Administration started work to prepare an interim budget. Rules for the formation of a budget and the payment of salaries have been reviewed and found to be largely satisfactory. The payment system has been revived and the salaries of central government staff have been paid in the capital for two months in a row. The process is now being extended to the provinces, and a full documentation of the staff and functions of government departments at the provincial level is being prepared.

15. The Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority has been created, and agreements in a number of sectors on both short-term priorities and long-term interventions have been reached with bilateral and multilateral parties. The Interim Administration has started to work on a national development framework in partnership with other development actors. Ministries and the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority are working collaboratively with United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organizations to put in place a series of national

programmes that reflect the Interim Administration's priorities and that are oriented towards building the capacity of the Afghan Government, civil society and private sector over time.

16. The Interim Administration has made a strong commitment to accountability and transparency. The first technical assistance project has been signed with the World Bank to provide for procurement, accounting and financial management functions to be handled by international firms from April 2002 onwards.

17. A back-to-school campaign is under way to ensure widespread student enrolment when the new school year begins on 23 March. Plans drawn by relevant ministers are being implemented with the active cooperation of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and non-governmental organizations. In the agricultural sector, an agreement was reached with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the United States Agency for International Development to distribute seeds and fertilizers in time for the spring planting. A dialogue between relevant ministers and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is under way to develop a programmatic approach to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. An Interim Administration/United Nations planning task force has been established to address the nutrition crisis. Preparations are under way to ensure that the focus of development activities is extended from Kabul to the provinces as quickly as possible. All of this, of course, will require sustained international financial support. It is earnestly hoped that the flow of resources from donors will increase significantly in April to allow these crucial programmes to be implemented.

18. The Interim Administration has passed four major decrees since its inauguration on 22 December. The first of these cancelled all decrees and legal documents passed by previous authorities. The second banned the cultivation, production, processing, use and trafficking of illicit drugs (and the Interim Administration is looking to the support of the international community for help in implementing this decree). The third decree set out a framework for the press and radio and television broadcasting, including principles for freedom of the press and procedures for licensing of the press by the Minister of Information and Culture. The fourth decree established procedures for signing

contracts or agreements with the international private sector and donor and development agencies, according to which all agreements must be ratified by the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority.

19. Perhaps as important as the specific decisions and actions taken by the Interim Administration is the way in which people from every part of Afghanistan have rallied around Chairman Karzai as a symbol of the return of peace and stability to the country. This was evident from the huge popular receptions that Mr. Karzai received during his visits to Herat and Jalalabad. Likewise, Afghans throughout the country continue to look to Kabul as the symbol of national unity, irrespective of their very strong regional affiliations. It is therefore an encouraging sign that the Interim Administration has started to invite regional leaders to Kabul to discuss issues of national importance. During the first two weeks of March, separate national conferences were held with education officials, all military commanders and all provincial governors. I hope that the dialogue between Kabul and the provinces will increase over time.

20. On a related issue, the Ministry of Women's Affairs organized a major national event in Kabul to commemorate International Women's Day on 8 March. This event, attended by Afghan women and men from around the country as well as foreign dignitaries, including Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Noeleen Heyzer, Executive Director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women and the Minister for Women's Affairs of Pakistan, marked an important step towards restoring to the women and girls of Afghanistan those fundamental rights that have been denied them over the past several decades.

21. At the international level, a significant development has been the diplomacy of Chairman Karzai and his administration. Mr. Karzai has travelled extensively, building the profile of the Interim Administration and championing the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In visits to neighbouring countries, whose support and non-interference are critical for the success of the Bonn process, the Interim Administration is trying to mend fences and forge good relations. Mr. Karzai himself has been an effective advocate for Afghanistan's dire needs. He has also been an ambassador of Afghanistan's aspirations, which are built on international responsibility and cooperation and participation in the international economy.

Mr. Karzai has emphasized that, while in the short term Afghanistan is forced to rely on humanitarian and developmental assistance, in the longer term trade will be the driver of growth and the creator of opportunity. Many of Mr. Karzai's discussions with international leaders have focused on trade relationships. The United States of America has promised Afghanistan most-favoured-nation status. Discussions on trade relationships are also under way with the European Union. An Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantee has been granted to provide incentives for private sector investors in Afghanistan.

22. Also on the international front, a significant development has been the participation of the Interim Administration, represented by Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, at the meeting of the "six-plus-two" group held in Kabul on 11 March. The inclusion of Afghanistan in these discussions opens a new and hopeful chapter in the dialogue to restore regional peace and stability, which has been undermined by inter-Afghan wars and foreign interference for the past two decades.

C. United Nations support to the Interim Administration and the civil service

23. The speed with which the Interim Administration has established its international and domestic legitimacy has been extremely impressive, especially given the meagre material resources at its disposal. Recognizing that the Interim Administration would need immediate cash in hand upon its establishment, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established, at the request of my Special Representative, the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund immediately after the conclusion of the Bonn Agreement.

24. Donors were initially asked to contribute \$20 million to the Fund to meet the most basic and immediate needs of the Interim Administration, especially salaries for the civil service. A larger figure was not sought at the outset in order to ensure that discussions could take place with the Interim Administration on immediate priorities and so that basic measures of accountability and transparency could be put in place, after which additional funds would be sought from donor countries.

25. Contributions to the Fund were slow to arrive and, despite pledges of \$16 million, only \$8.6 million had been committed and \$1 million actually paid by 31 December. Nevertheless, UNDP was able to provide complete office kits, including desks, chairs, computers, facsimile machines, telephones and vehicles to the Chairman and each of the 29 ministers.

26. Within a week of its creation, the Interim Administration established a Working Group, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance and assisted by the United Nations, to come up with a very detailed list of government employees in Kabul and the provinces, as well as a mechanism for the payment of salaries. Within a matter of days, the Group had assessed the size of the entire Afghan civil service. It was initially estimated to consist of 240,000 employees at most, including staff of local administrations, workers in State-owned enterprises, ministry staff, teachers, health workers and police, but excluding the armed forces. This is considered to be an appropriate numerical ratio of civil servants to the population. The civil service's technical capacity and quality, however, needs to be enhanced significantly.

27. The Working Group suggested that the average amount of financial support required per employee was approximately \$28 per month, supplemented by a food ration provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) until October 2002, which amounted to the equivalent of \$12 per month per employee. This rather low figure was suggested bearing in mind that the funds would have to be raised from external resources.

28. Based on this wage structure, and assuming that the size of the civil service was probably less than 240,000, it was determined that approximately \$50 million would be required to cover the salaries and related expenses of the Interim Administration for the period from January to June 2002. Moreover, the Working Group recommended paying civil servants back pay for the previous five months, which would cost approximately \$40 million.

29. As at 8 March, \$32.3 million had been pledged to the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund and \$26.8 million had been received. The European Commission has recently pledged to contribute another 20 million euros to replenish the Fund, and to provide the full amount requested for the period from January to June 2002, if salaries are paid in United States dollars.

30. So far 77,000 civil servants' salaries have been paid from the Fund. It was a real tour de force to enable the Interim Administration to start paying salaries for its first month in existence. My gratitude goes to the donor countries that contributed the funds, to UNDP officials who worked in Kabul and New York to physically transport the money to Kabul on time and to the Afghan officials who worked around the clock to manually prepare, in cooperation with United Nations personnel, the lists of civil servants to be paid.

31. At the same time, civil service salaries in most of the provinces have not been paid, as the Interim Administration has not yet been able to obtain payroll information for the provincial employees. With regard to the level and roster of provincial employees, Ministry of Finance and UNDP staff are now visiting key cities in the provinces to obtain the information necessary to begin meeting the provincial payroll. In addition, payroll expenditures for teachers will increase in March with the opening of the school year. While \$10 million in cash has been pre-positioned in Islamabad to pay salaries for the months of February and March, the disbursement has been delayed, pending a decision from the Interim Administration on the currency to be used (i.e., United States dollars or afghanis).

D. Civil Service Commission

32. Even more challenging than determining the size of the civil service and mechanisms for the payment of salaries is the articulation of and adherence to criteria for civil service recruitment. The Bonn Agreement provides for the establishment of a Civil Service Commission to address these criteria, with the assistance of the United Nations, although it does not prescribe its composition or set a deadline by which it must be convened.

33. In the meantime, the Interim Administration has issued 88 commands appointing people to high-ranking military and civilian posts (governors and deputy ministers) and 740 orders assigning people to lower-ranking posts in the military and civilian departments. Many of these appointments have given rise to increasing criticism, with, in particular, allegations that they are too often based on family or ethnic ties, factionalism and patronage. Such concerns underscore the urgent need to establish a Civil Service Commission. A small group of dedicated officials

nominated by Chairman Karzai has worked with the Office of the Special Representative and has completed the preparatory work for the establishment of the Civil Service Commission. This work is based on a 1970 law that established a similar body. It is expected that the Interim Administration will soon enact a decree that will allow the Commission to begin functioning.

E. Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga

34. The United Nations has been given a key role to play with regard to the emergency *loya jirga*. Specifically, it has been requested to assist in the establishment and functioning of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency *Loya Jirga*; to advise the Interim Authority on establishing a politically neutral environment conducive to the holding of the emergency *loya jirga* in free and fair conditions; to attend, if invited, the meetings of the Special Independent Commission; and to facilitate the resolution of any impasses arising from matters related to the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*.

35. The Bonn Agreement called for the Special Independent Commission for the Emergency *Loya Jirga* to be established within one month of the formation of the Interim Authority. I was particularly gratified, therefore, to have been present in Kabul on 25 January, when Chairman Karzai was able to announce its formation on schedule. The Commission was officially inaugurated on 7 February in the presence of the Chairman and members of the Interim Administration, other Afghan dignitaries, the diplomatic corps and the national and international media. Chairman Karzai made it clear in his speech on that occasion that the Interim Administration respected fully and would safeguard the independent status of the Commission. He encouraged the Commission to work in all regions of the country. Their work over the coming months, supported by the United Nations, will be critical to the creation of a *loya jirga* that represents the popular wishes of all Afghans.

36. The members of the Commission were selected following an extensive process of consultation with a wide range of intellectuals, civil society groups, religious and political leaders and members of the

Interim Administration. The 21 commissioners were chosen from a cross-section of ethnic and religious groups, based on their technical qualifications, reputation and standing in the community, from more than 300 names proposed; 3 of the 21 commissioners, including a Vice-Chairperson, are women.

37. To further ensure the independence of the Commission, it has been decided that it will be funded through the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has generously provided the initial funds required, in the amount of 500,000 pounds, to enable the Commission to commence its activities. Discussions are now ongoing with potential donors to fund additional logistical requirements of the Commission, as well as for the organization of the emergency *loya jirga* itself.

38. The Commission has been making progress towards formulating the rules and procedures for the convening and the conduct of the *loya jirga*. They are expected to be announced on 21 March, the Afghan New Year. The commissioners, accompanied by United Nations staff, have begun to undertake visits to Afghanistan's provinces with a view to increasing awareness of the Commission's role and to solicit advice from the people about how to make the emergency *loya jirga* as representative and fair as possible. Very successful public meetings have been held in the Ghor, Bamyan, Paktia, Nangarhar and Laghman provinces, where Afghans have demonstrated overwhelming support for the emergency *loya jirga*, including the participation of women.

39. At the same time, Afghans have expressed the fear that armed groups could influence the selection or election — the Bonn Agreement provides for both — of delegates to the *loya jirga*. The Commission has so far been able to operate without interference from outside parties, but it is feared that the political pressure on the commissioners will increase substantially as the date for the formation of the emergency *loya jirga* draws closer. Already there have been reports of money being distributed and widespread lobbying by political groups and powerful figures who are trying to get large numbers of their supporters into the emergency *loya jirga*.

40. The emergency *loya jirga* is a crucial milestone in the Bonn process. I strongly appeal to all Afghan parties to do everything possible to enhance the

credibility and legitimacy of what will be a momentous event in the recent history of Afghanistan. I also strongly appeal to Member States and the international community as a whole to maintain their political commitment and to redouble their efforts to support the peace process during the coming critical months.

F. Human Rights and Judicial Commissions

41. In addition to the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency *Loya Jirga* and the Civil Service Commission, the Bonn Agreement calls for the United Nations to assist in the establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission and a Judicial Commission. There is a growing sense of urgency to establish these two Commissions now that the *loya jirga* process is well under way.

42. In a cooperative initiative between representatives of Afghan civil society, officials of the Interim Administration and the United Nations, a national workshop on human rights was convened in Kabul on 9 March. The participants represented a wide spectrum of Afghan society, including men and women, a range of ethnic groups and representatives from various regions of the country. They included human rights specialists and activists drawn from national non-governmental organizations, academia, the Special Independent Commission and relevant ministries of the Interim Administration. The meeting was opened by Chairman Karzai and was chaired by Sima Samar, Vice-Chairperson of the Interim Administration and Minister for Women's Affairs. The keynote address was delivered by Mrs. Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The workshop produced four standing working groups, composed entirely of Afghans, which will formulate proposals for: (a) the establishment of the independent Human Rights Commission; (b) the development of the national programme of human rights education; (c) approaches to human rights monitoring, investigation and remedial action; and (d) the advancement of the rights of women. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the Special Representative are currently supporting these groups in the follow-up to the workshop, which marks an important first step in the implementation of the human rights provisions of the Bonn Agreement.

43. Once the Human Rights Commission is established and functioning, the United Nations will be in a better position to further develop its plans for fulfilling the human rights-related responsibilities entrusted to it in the Bonn Agreement. In this regard, the United Nations approach will be guided by Afghan human rights organizations and activists, who are best placed to advise on how international human rights law and standards can be implemented in Afghanistan's particular social, political and cultural context. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has seconded a human rights adviser to the Office of the Special Representative in Kabul to provide advice to him in these initial stages of development of a human rights programme. The activities of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Kamal Hossain, will also continue to constitute an important component of United Nations human rights engagement with Afghanistan.

44. As with the Human Rights Commission, the work of the Judicial Commission will touch on issues central to the values and traditions of different segments of Afghan society. It is imperative, therefore, that the Afghan men and women chosen to serve on the Commission be highly respected, apolitical and suitably qualified to discharge their duties. The Interim Administration will cooperate closely with lawyers and judges, other interested parties and individuals and the United Nations to identify potential candidates for the Commission, with a view to establishing it as soon as possible.

III. Security

A. General situation

45. Juxtaposed against the remarkable progress made in the formation of the Interim Administration and the Special Independent Commission for the Emergency *Loya Jirga* is the unstable security situation, which remains very worrying in certain parts of the country. Unlike in Kabul — where the efforts of the Interior Ministry and the presence of the International Security Assistance Force, led by the United Kingdom, have pushed the crime rate down and improved stability — the situation across the rest of the country, especially outside the main towns, has remained volatile and unpredictable.

46. In general, insecurity remains the prime cause of concern for Afghans across the country for three reasons in particular. First, although al-Qa`idah and Taliban forces have been routed, pockets of resistance remain. Second, factional clashes are taking place between rival Afghan political and military actors seeking regional influence, which has led to both inter- and intra-ethnic violence. Third, banditry continues as a lingering manifestation of the war economy that has developed over the past two decades in the absence of proper security and a system of enforceable law.

47. As concerns the terrorist threat, serious fighting suddenly flared up in the south-eastern region, between the coalition forces and a large, well-equipped and determined group of al-Qa`idah and Taliban fighters in the beginning of March. The severity of that encounter alone serves as a sober reminder of what coalition leaders, as well as the United Nations, have been repeating regularly: the struggle against terrorism and those who support it in Afghanistan is not over and, furthermore, it is closely linked to the success of the peace process. The peace process remains under threat by terrorist groups and those who support them, and there is no room for complacency.

48. While the vast majority of Afghans are united in their desire to eradicate terrorism from Afghanistan's soil, the collapse of the Taliban regime has precipitated struggles for power both within the Interim Administration and in the regions. In the south, factional fighting tends to be intra-ethnic, while in the north, clashes have been reported between ethnic groups, in particular between Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara factions.

49. Rivalries continue to flare up across the Pashtun areas as different groups forge alliances and vie with each other for power. Several parts of the southern provinces of Helmand and Nimruz remain off limits. At the end of February, there were reports of clashes between forces of the Pashtun Noorzai and Ismael Khan, the governor of Herat province.

50. In the north, fighting in late January and early February between Jamiat (Tajik) and Jumbesh (Uzbek) forces left about 20 dead and injured. A team from the Interim Administration and the United Nations travelled to Mazar-e-Sharif, and after mediation the parties promised to abide by an agreement to demilitarize the city and to establish a security commission. The rivalry between local commanders

remains intense, however, and the situation in the city is uneasy. An initial group of a 600-person-strong multi-ethnic police force, with representation from all the political parties, was created, and armed units were withdrawn to barracks. Nonetheless, a few weeks after the troops withdrew, fighting erupted between two garrison commanders, resulting in two dead and several wounded, and serving as a reminder that the situation remains unpredictable.

51. In Gardez, the Interim Administration's appointment of Badshah Khan Zadran as provincial governor met with fierce local resistance in early February. Badshah Khan tried to take Gardez and the governor's seat militarily, but was beaten back by forces loyal to the local shura. Fifty people, mainly civilians, died in the fighting. The threat of renewed conflict remains, though the situation has so far been stabilized following Chairman Karzai's appointment of a new governor, who is from outside the area.

52. While many of the incidents cited above are rooted in political struggles for power, there have also been reports of ethnically motivated attacks and serious violations of human rights. I am very concerned, in particular, about reports in the north of the harassment of Pashtuns by other ethnic groups, which has led to a flow of refugees towards Pakistan. United Nations personnel, as well as non-governmental organizations and human rights organizations, have visited dozens of villages in the north and have documented numerous incidents of violence and looting over the past three months. Chairman Karzai appointed a three-person special independent commission to investigate the situation of ethnic minorities there, which has just submitted its report. Also, during her visit to Afghanistan in early March, the High Commissioner for Human Rights visited the north, interviewed victims and spoke to commanders and local officials. Local authorities in the north have promised to act rapidly to put an end to the abuses.

53. All of the above strongly argues for urgent action, especially: (a) an active effort on the part of Afghan leaders to bring their more reluctant peers into the political process and to become personally involved in ensuring the investigation of allegations of human rights violations; (b) a rapid effort to train and equip an Afghan security force that is effective and loyal to the Interim Authority; and, (c) an international effort to help bridge the security gap between current

arrangements and the eventual deployment of an effective Afghan security force.

54. The need for speed on this front is highlighted by the fact that even isolated incidents can have a tremendously negative psychological impact on elements of the population that remain sceptical about the prospects of the Bonn process. This was particularly true after the murder of Dr. Rahman, the Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism, at Kabul Airport on 14 February. Mr. Karzai has established a ministerial commission to investigate the murder, whose circumstances remain unclear and subject to competing theories. Zalmi Rassoul, an aide to the former King, Zahir Shah, was appointed to replace the late Dr. Rahman.

B. International Security Assistance Force

55. In annex I to the Bonn Agreement, the parties to the Agreement called for the deployment of an international security force to assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas. Pursuant to that request, the Security Council adopted resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001 authorizing the establishment for six months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations, can operate in a secure environment.

56. The United Kingdom agreed to lead this force for the first three months, and 17 other Member States agreed to participate in it. Deployment began in early January, following the conclusion of a military-technical agreement between the United Kingdom and the Interim Administration on 4 January. Initial operating capability (one fully functioning battalion and support units) was reached in mid-January. The International Security Assistance Force declared the achievement of full operational capacity on 18 February and now has over 4,800 troops conducting 30 patrols a day around the clock; about 50 per cent of the patrols are conducted jointly with the local police. The Force Commander, Major-General John McColl, has indicated that patrolling would be increased in order to tackle the "lawless elements" of Kabul. The return of Afghan military units to barracks has progressed

smoothly, and there are only small groups remaining outside designated army quarters. The Ministry of Defence said it has told these soldiers to move to barracks very soon.

57. The residents of Kabul have uniformly welcomed the presence of the International Security Assistance Force. In addition, most Afghans, including powerful regional figures such as General Rashid Dostum and Abdul Karim Khalili, have requested that the Force be deployed beyond Kabul (i.e., beyond the limits set in the military-technical agreement and resolution 1386 (2001), but as envisaged in the Bonn Agreement), where an ongoing lack of security presents a serious threat to the Bonn process by leaving open the possibility of a return to the dynamics of 1992.

58. In his presentation to the Security Council on 30 January, Mr. Karzai stated that the extension of the presence of multinational forces in Kabul to other major cities would signal the ongoing commitment of the international community to peace and security in Afghanistan. He asked the Council to authorize those measures.

59. At present, the Force remains limited to Kabul, while the main threats to the Interim Administration emanate from the provinces. There is a continuing danger that existing security structures, both Afghan and international, will not adequately address the security threats that are currently discernible and that are likely to increase as the convening of the emergency *loya jirga* approaches. I hope that the Security Council will consider these factors and support the wish of the Afghan people for the expansion of the Force.

C. Creation of and provision of support to the national security sector

60. As stated in the Bonn Agreement, the responsibility for ensuring security throughout Afghanistan ultimately rests with the Afghans themselves. To this end, international security forces are a temporary measure to provide the confidence, time and breathing room required for the creation of an indigenous security sector (a national army, police force, judicial system and corrections system). It is therefore urgent that such a security sector be established as quickly as possible, constituted in accordance with and guided by international

humanitarian and human rights law. A Joint Coordination Body was established on 13 January to ensure close cooperation between the Interim Administration, the International Security Assistance Force and the United Nations on matters related to the security sector. The Joint Coordination Body has now met five times, on a fortnightly basis, and includes the heads of the Departments of Defence and Interior, General Muhammad Qassem Fahim and Mohammed Yunus Qanooni respectively, as well as the Commander of the Force, Major General McColl, and my Special Representative.

The national army

61. The task of creating a national army that is truly multi-ethnic and apolitical requires the following, at a minimum:

- (a) Political agreement on its primary purposes;
- (b) Political agreement on its overall size and command structure;
- (c) International assistance for its design, training and equipment;
- (d) International assistance to sustain operating costs in the initial period, including payment of salaries and benefits;
- (e) Creation of incentives for reducing existing force levels.

62. These issues are now being hotly debated, including in the Joint Coordination Body. After intense debate over the size and structure of a future Afghan army, following the publication of two papers produced respectively by the International Security Assistance Force, which proposed a force of 50,000, and the Ministry of Defence, which suggested a force of 200,000, training of the first battalion of the new Afghan National Guard by International Security Assistance Force started on 17 February. The Ministry of Defence was asked to provide 20 men from each of Afghanistan's 32 provinces and to ensure that they reflected Afghanistan's ethnic balance. After a worryingly slow start and grossly imbalanced ethnic composition, the programme is now satisfactorily under way. The National Guard will be based primarily in Kabul and will be responsible for guarding the Presidential Palace and the ministries. The details of a larger training programme, led by the United States, are expected shortly, based on the results of a recent

visit to Kabul by an assessment team from United States Central Command.

63. The creation of a national army risks generating additional security problems rather than solving existing ones if: (a) the army is perceived as an instrument to further the political ambitions of one political group or military faction; and (b) a parallel programme is not put in place to provide alternative employment for those former combatants not selected to serve in the new army. In this respect, a programme for reintegration and demobilization, as opposed to the traditional sequence of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, appears to be best suited to the present situation in Afghanistan. This will require a concerted effort by donor countries, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the international financial institutions to urgently identify and fund labour-intensive projects that target former combatants. My Special Representative and his deputy for relief, recovery and reconstruction, have initiated discussions on this issue with the Interim Authority, the International Security Assistance Force and the United Nations system, with the aim of making progress on it as soon as possible.

64. Meanwhile, authorities in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat have been carrying out limited disarmament programmes. They are being conducted by the new police and security forces that have been formed in those cities. In Kandahar it was reported that some groups had resisted handing over their weapons, firing on the authorities. In Mazar-e-Sharif the number of armed people in the city has been substantially reduced; and in Khulm, Samangan province, where fighting recently took place, a special commission decided that all local commanders and their armed groups should be disarmed. By the end of February, 34 heavy weapons and 191 light weapons had been collected by the local police and stored in a depot. In Kabul, guns are supposed to be kept only if they are registered and the owner has a valid permit. People carrying weapons entering the city are required to deposit them with the police for the time of their stay in the capital. The police are planning a more thorough campaign involving house searches in the near future.

65. Deep suspicions remain, however, and it is said that powerful factions and local commanders are in fact disarming their adversaries as a means to actually arm more of their supporters. This is, in particular, a

complaint heard from many Pashtun groups in the north and west, who claim they are being disarmed and victimized by members of ethnic groups who are still armed.

66. I am particularly concerned by constraints in the traditional conditions of international assistance that make it difficult to meet the recurrent costs, salaries and benefits for the future Afghan military. The fact remains that if the military issues are not properly addressed and a genuine national security force is not established and paid regularly, the Bonn process risks being severely undermined. In a complex post-conflict situation, such as that in Afghanistan, proper management of the security sector is the necessary first step towards reconciliation and reconstruction; indeed, managing this sector may be considered the first reconstruction project.

The national police

67. The Interim Administration, and the Ministry of Interior in particular, recognizes that international assistance will be required to create, train and sustain an Afghan national police force. In this regard, they have requested the Government of Germany to lead a bilateral and multilateral effort, in the light of previous cooperation between Germany and Afghanistan in this field.

68. A meeting held on 13 February in Berlin to discuss international support for the Afghan police force was attended by representatives from 18 nations, including Afghanistan, and 11 international organizations, including United Nations agencies. Germany presented a report from a fact-finding mission it had dispatched to Kabul in January, and pledged 10 million euros in 2002 to support the Afghan police. This money would go towards training, including the provision of 11 instructors, the renovation of the police academy and reconstruction of police stations in Kabul. Some of the 50 police vehicles donated by the German Government have started to arrive in the capital. Other significant contributions were promised by Belgium, China, India, Norway, Pakistan and the Russian Federation. The United Kingdom has already provided communication equipment, uniforms and basic resources to the police in Kabul. Finally, the International Security Assistance Force is repairing police stations there.

69. A second donor meeting on the provision of international support to the Afghan police was held in Berlin on 14 and 15 March 2002, at which Germany presented an overall plan for the training of and support for reform of the Afghan police. A list of urgent requirements was distributed, and delegations were asked to respond with specific contributions. The first team of German police officers arrived in Kabul on 16 March, and the German Coordination Office began working in Kabul on 18 March.

70. With regard to support to the Interim Administration on the issue of drug control, Germany has indicated that the restructured Afghan police will include a strong and efficient drug-control unit. The United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) will continue to work with the Interim Administration on overall coordination related to internationally sponsored drug-control initiatives for Afghanistan.

71. In the meantime, the Ministry of Interior has presented a detailed plan for the reform and training of police. It established, on 3 March, a 15-member security committee, and is soon to establish a National Commission on Police Reform. The police academy has already initiated a course run by local instructors. The next focus, pending the availability of financial resources, will be on training 3,200 police officers (including 100 female officers) — 100 from each province.

72. The Bonn Agreement does not prescribe any role for the United Nations in the area of policing. The Civilian Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has, however, temporarily seconded one civilian police officer to the Office of the Special Representative in Kabul to liaise with the Interior Ministry and keep the Special Representative informed of plans being formulated by Governments engaged in bilateral assistance. The desirability and efficacy of any future United Nations role in this area can be evaluated only once sufficient details have been obtained on the extent to which bilateral efforts, under German coordination, can address the needs. Based on the plans presented in Berlin for training and reform of the Afghan police, I recommend an expansion of the United Nations police presence in UNAMA to a total of four police advisers. In close cooperation with the German team, and as requested by the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the four United Nations police advisers would have the following tasks, respectively: (a) to

advise the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on policing and security-related matters and to coordinate with other international agencies and Member States regarding support to the Afghan police; (b) to provide advice and assistance to the chiefs of departments in the Ministry of Interior, as well as to commissions and working groups established by the Ministry; (c) to work closely with the German police team and its Afghan counterparts on the recruitment and training of the Afghan police; and (d) to work closely with the Commander of the Kabul police on strategic and operational planning, and provide on-the-job advice to personnel in the Kabul police district, in close cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force.

IV. Humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction

73. The international focus on the Bonn process should not obscure the fact that millions of Afghans remain dependent on the United Nations for basic life-saving assistance. Humanitarian assistance has provided a vital lifeline to the country for the past two decades. The events of 11 September and their consequences profoundly challenged the United Nations and its partners to continue their assistance and to help prevent an even greater humanitarian catastrophe. Some six months later, it is clear that both challenges have been substantially met. This can be attributed in large part to the resilience of the Afghan people themselves, as well as to the dedication of the humanitarian assistance community and the generosity of international donors who responded to emergency appeals for funding and resources. There remains a need to continue a well-financed response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis for some time to come.

74. In responding to the crisis in Afghanistan, the United Nations and its partners had to overcome severe constraints. I particularly wish to pay tribute to the heroic efforts of thousands of Afghan relief workers who, especially after 11 September, remained at their posts and enabled agencies to furnish at least minimal levels of assistance in many areas. That said, poor security conditions have restricted access to much of the country and have left key vulnerable groups without assistance for several months. The gradual improvement in the security environment since mid-November has allowed humanitarian agencies to

expand their operations rapidly and to redeploy international staff to all major urban areas. Relief workers could also access many rural areas where a large number of people had sought refuge during the fighting.

75. Strengthened regional coordination arrangements and close cooperation with the States neighbouring Afghanistan also allowed agencies to significantly increase cross-border deliveries of humanitarian assistance. This has been especially important in the north, which is now receiving assistance through new border crossings with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

76. WFP delivered more than 115,000 tons of food in December alone, preventing widespread famine and further large-scale displacements during the winter months. Against considerable odds, it was able to deliver significant quantities of food to remote areas in the Central Highlands before bad weather made those areas inaccessible. WFP also conducted city-wide food distributions in Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.

77. Despite these interventions, reports of malnutrition in many drought-affected areas and hitherto inaccessible mountainous and rural zones persist. I am very concerned that many lives could be lost, especially among vulnerable children, unless immediate remedial action is taken. Reports of micronutrient deficiencies suggest that the nutritional situation in Afghanistan is acute, and therefore requires an extraordinary and rapid response. WFP is implementing helicopter-assisted emergency food need assessments in remote but severely affected areas, and other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have reinitiated nutrition surveys and targeted emergency feeding programmes. It is important to point out, however, that in many remote areas, banditry, lack of communication and poor or non-existent infrastructure continue to hamper relief efforts.

78. In concert with the Interim Administration, United Nations agencies and their partners have resumed most of the health services they had provided before September 2001. Currently, an estimated 70 per cent of the Afghan population is dependent on health services provided by the international community. UNICEF and the Ministry of Health have begun a countrywide measles immunization campaign, targeting more than 9 million children.

79. Landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to constitute a significant threat to the safety and security of the Afghan population and the international community, denying access to over 850 square kilometres of land and causing dozens of casualties every week. In response to this situation, the Mine Action Programme has been expanding its survey, clearance and awareness operations in the most affected parts of the country. All of the 15 partner non-governmental organizations are again conducting operations, with more than 90 per cent of mine action personnel back at work. Most organizations must replace substantial amounts of equipment lost during factional fighting, air strikes and looting. Key access routes and other high-priority areas have been cleared, allowing humanitarian assistance and returning refugees and internally displaced persons to reach an expanding number of areas. Mine action operations will continue to be an essential prerequisite to many of the humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction efforts being planned and implemented throughout the country.

80. The Salang tunnel, north of Kabul, was opened on 19 January by the Minister for Public Works. The tunnel was cleared by Russian Emergency Services and the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, with the assistance of the Halo Trust. Although the tunnel is not yet fully operational and will require further repair, traffic, including trucks, has begun to flow again, boosting both humanitarian assistance efforts and trade with Central Asia.

81. More than 3.5 million Afghans currently live in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran as refugees. Upwards of 1 million people have been displaced within Afghanistan by conflict and drought. Since the beginning of this year, an estimated 47,000 new refugees have crossed into Baluchistan province in Pakistan, fleeing insecurity, ethnic tensions and the after-effects of drought. UNHCR has set up 19 new camps in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province, which assist more than 230,000 refugees.

82. The Interim Administration has highlighted the importance of providing assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons (estimated to make up some 20 per cent of the country's population) and supporting their reintegration into their home communities. To better target assistance, humanitarian agencies have been re-registering and surveying refugee and internally displaced person populations to

determine where they come from and what their return plans are. Agencies have also been compiling profiles of districts of origin, ascertaining what physical assistance is needed and what protection concerns may exist (for example, in the case of minority groups). UNHCR, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Repatriation and the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, has been preparing to help up to 1.2 million refugees and internally displaced persons return to their homes in 2002. This requires creating a legal and operational framework in which repatriation can take place. Agreements are accordingly being negotiated with the Interim Administration and the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. The repatriation programme will also include the provision of transport, aid packages and shelter materials; the implementation of quick-impact projects to meet immediate needs in areas of return; and mechanisms to monitor returnees' protection requirements. So far this year, more than 250,000 people have returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since UNHCR opened its first voluntary repatriation centre near Peshawar on 1 March, refugees have been returning at a rate of 5,000 families per week.

83. Over the winter, agencies have been providing emergency assistance to internally displaced persons in areas of displacement. The focus is now, however, shifting towards providing assistance to areas of return. Since the beginning of this year, the United Nations and its partners have helped more than 30,000 internally displaced persons return from Kabul and the Panjshir Valley to the Shomali Plain.

84. The need for a strong and flexible United Nations humanitarian response capacity was highlighted in the past weeks by an earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale that shook much of Central Asia. While damage was lighter than in other recent earthquakes due to its depth, it nonetheless profoundly affected some communities, notably Khostak in the north-east, where 300 houses were destroyed, and Surkundar in the province of Samangan. Surkundar was struck by a massive landslide following the earthquake, which buried many homes, killed more than 100 people and displaced thousands more. The United Nations and its non-governmental organization partners have organized an emergency response to both Khostak and Surkundar, involving the provision of food, medical care and shelter. WFP, the United Nations Special Mission to

Afghanistan (UNSMA), and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also facilitated a visit by Chairman Karzai to the affected area.

85. Adding to humanitarian concerns is the worrying resumption of poppy cultivation in the southern (Kandahar, Helmund and Uruzgan provinces) and eastern regions of Afghanistan. According to the results of a pre-assessment survey carried out by UNDCP in February, the production of opium this year is likely to be in the range of 1,900 to 2,700 tons. UNDCP will carry out a comprehensive survey between April and August and release the results in September.

86. Afghanistan will require massive amounts of international financial assistance for the foreseeable future in order to meet current humanitarian needs, initiate recovery and work towards the long-term reconstruction of the country. On 21 January, I attended the opening of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo. It was attended by 61 countries and 21 international organizations. The delegation of the Interim Administration was led by Mr. Karzai. The Conference demonstrated its strong commitment to Afghanistan by committing \$1.8 billion for 2002 and more than \$4.5 billion over the next five years.

87. On 28 February, the United Nations and the Interim Authority launched an update to the Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002 in Kabul. On the same day I sent a letter to all Member States requesting that they contribute funds to this programme. The Programme contains United Nations and non-governmental organization projects requiring some \$1.18 billion and focusing on urgent humanitarian needs, immediate recovery projects and longer-term reconstruction and governance support. Common to all activities is the prioritization of capacity-building of the Afghan administration and civil society. The United Nations and the Interim Authority will continue to review projects on a sector-by-sector basis, based on national priorities and in cooperation with local authorities. Donors are strongly urged to support the highest priority projects and to work closely with the United Nations and the Interim Authority to ensure that resources are well-targeted and allocated quickly.

V. Current United Nations deployment in Afghanistan

88. My Special Representative arrived in Kabul on 21 December 2001 to begin carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to him in the Bonn Agreement and its annexes. He was accompanied by a small team from his immediate office (originally New York-based), consisting of a total of six international Professional-level officers and one personal assistant. He was joined by a small complement of staff from the existing United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, whose international staff had been based in Islamabad. A technical survey team from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was deployed in Kabul to begin developing options for enhancing United Nations activities. Round-the-clock work in the preceding week by administrative and logistical support staff from the Office of Mission Support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations enabled this team to become fully functional, with complete communication and logistical support in place by 22 December.

89. Up until now, a number of factors have prohibited a rapid expansion of international staff in Afghanistan. First, security ceilings (covering staff from all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) remain in place for Kabul and other major urban centres, restricting the total number of international United Nations staff that can deploy there at any one time. Such ceilings have been raised only recently, to 300 in Kabul, 60 in Mazar-e-Sharif, 70 in Herat, 45 in Kandahar, 30 in Jalalabad and 18 in Faizabad. Second, war damage and years of neglect have limited the number of premises available for accommodation.

90. The presence of international staff from the Office of my Special Representative and UNSMA is limited outside of Kabul to two political/civil affairs officers in Mazar-e-Sharif, one in Herat, one in Kandahar and another in Jalalabad. Security restrictions and logistical constraints remain in those cities, limiting the number of staff that can be deployed there.

91. The Office of the Special Representative and UNSMA presently have very limited capacity to monitor or assist in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement throughout the country. This is particularly troubling given the extent to which local dynamics and regional power bases are a factor in the political

environment of Afghanistan. What my Special Representative and his colleagues have accomplished thus far, under the circumstances, is truly remarkable.

92. The Office of the Special Representative and UNSMA staff are now based in a small house in Kabul, since the Taliban seized the UNSMA office building in June 2001. The Interim Administration has returned the building to the United Nations, but it has been severely damaged and needs extensive repair before it can be used again. In this regard, I am most grateful to the members of the Security Council and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for having made possible the provision of \$15 million that will enable such repairs to be undertaken, as well as allow for the provision of additional staff and equipment that will support the timely establishment of a new United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

93. All United Nations agencies, funds and programmes moved the centre of their activities from Islamabad to Kabul within several weeks of the installation of the Interim Administration. Their total deployment in Afghanistan remains constrained by security restrictions, as noted above. But all still maintain offices in Islamabad, which will be required for some time to come, as procurement, banking and other needs cannot yet be catered to in Kabul. A consolidation and streamlining of the Islamabad-based offices for Afghanistan is required, however, to minimize the duplication of overhead costs being incurred in both Kabul and Islamabad. This consolidation is in process.

VI. Proposed structure for the United Nations presence in Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

A. Mandate

94. As is evident from the information provided above, the United Nations has relied as much as possible on existing capacities in the region to support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, while continuing its critical humanitarian and immediate recovery efforts. At the same time, given that all of these activities in one way or another affect the peace

process, it is essential that they be conducted in an integrated fashion.

95. My Special Representative already has an overall coordinating role for all United Nations activities in Afghanistan. The next step, to ensure that all United Nations efforts are harnessed to fully support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, would be to integrate all the existing United Nations elements in Afghanistan into a single mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

96. Since the convening of the meeting at Bonn at the end of November, the entire United Nations system — at the Headquarters level as well as in the region — has been engaged in extensive consultations on the proposed structure and form of the United Nations presence in Afghanistan. Such discussions have been coordinated by the Integrated Mission Task Force for Afghanistan, and have been informed by active input from the members of the United Nations Development Group and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs and the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. A broad consensus within the entire United Nations system has now been achieved on how UNAMA should function.

97. Should the Security Council authorize its establishment, the core of the mission's mandate would entail:

(a) Fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, which were endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1383 (2001);

(b) Promoting national reconciliation and rapprochement throughout the country, through the good offices role of my Special Representative;

(c) Managing all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, under the overall authority of my Special Representative and in coordination with the Interim Authority and successor administrations of Afghanistan.

B. Basic operating principles

98. The structure and initial size of UNAMA are proposed with the following basic operating principles in mind:

(a) It should be a unified, integrated structure under the authority and leadership of the Special Representative for Afghanistan. The planning and conduct of all United Nations activities in Afghanistan and the implementation of the UNAMA mandate must take place under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

(b) The overall objective of UNAMA should be to provide support for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement processes, including the stabilization of the emerging structures of the Afghan Interim Authority, while recognizing that the responsibility for the Agreement's implementation ultimately rests with the Afghans themselves;

(c) UNAMA should undertake close coordination and consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority and other Afghan actors to ensure that Afghan priorities lead the mission's assistance efforts;

(d) UNAMA should aim to bolster Afghan capacity (both official and non-governmental), relying on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, and using common support services where possible, thereby leaving a light expatriate "footprint";

(e) UNAMA should have a unified presence and coordination capacity in regional offices and in selected high-priority provincial capitals, in addition to the Kabul-based headquarters;

(f) A rights-based and gender-sensitive approach would be integrated fully into the United Nations activities in Afghanistan;

(g) In all United Nations activities, special attention would have to be paid to vulnerable groups;

(h) Recovery and reconstruction efforts cannot await the successful conclusion of the peace process, but rather their early and effective delivery are central to the success of the process itself;

(i) Not all of the tasks that UNAMA may be asked to perform have yet been identified, as the next phases of the Bonn process will most probably offer new avenues for cooperation between the new authorities and the United Nations. The mission will therefore have to be developed in a phased manner (to also include the relevant expertise to support the electoral and constitutional processes outlined in the Bonn Agreement). This will depend on security

conditions, the extent of assistance provided bilaterally and through other international organizations and arrangements and the refinement of strategies by my Special Representative in the light of experience on the ground.

C. Proposed overall structure

99. In addition to an Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and an administrative and logistical support component, it is proposed that the mission have two main arms, or "pillars". Each of the two pillars would be headed by a Deputy Special Representative, at the rank of Assistant Secretary-General, reporting directly to my Special Representative. Both Deputy Special Representatives have been named: they are Jean Arnault, who would head the political affairs pillar, and Nigel Fisher, who would head the humanitarian and development pillar. The mission would be headquartered in Kabul, with regional offices based in seven cities: Bamiyan, Gardez, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and one city in the north-east. Liaison offices would be maintained in Islamabad, Tehran and possibly one or two additional cities of neighbouring countries, in recognition of the regional dimension of the Afghan conflict.

100. The mission would not have any uniformed personnel, with the exception of a few advisers on military and civilian police matters, and a few lightly armed international personnel required to provide close protection.

D. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

101. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would initially build on the current complement of staff already on board, and would consist of the following: a Director of Office/Chief of Staff; special assistants; a Military Advisory Unit to liaise with the International Security Assistance Force; and a Legal Unit (for traditional United Nations-related legal matters — including issues related to privileges and immunities, status-of-mission agreements and contractual obligations — as opposed to domestic rule-of-law-related matters).

102. It would also have an Office of Communication and Public Information, which would carry out the public information work of the mission, eventually including media relations, video and photo coverage, production or co-production of radio programmes, development of publications, maintenance of the web site and public outreach activities. The Spokesperson, who would head the Office, would speak for the entire mission. The Office would also support the development of a national media capacity, working in conjunction with the Interim Authority and bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts.

103. Human rights and gender issues will be central to the purposes and functions of the mission. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would, in addition, require advisory expertise in those areas that cut across all aspects of the mission's work, in the areas of human rights, the rule of law (judicial, police and penal system) and gender equality. The mission's approach in those areas would especially rely on the lead set by the Human Rights and Judicial Commissions, as well as by the Ministry for Women's Affairs, for which the UNAMA advisers in those areas (mainly Afghan nationals) should provide daily support and assistance. Each adviser would coordinate mission-wide activities in his or her respective area. Senior human rights, judicial and gender advisers in the Office of the Special Representative would provide the necessary guidance and direction to staff in both pillars of the mission to ensure that a rights-based and gender-sensitive approach was applied in all aspects of the mission's work.

E. Pillar I: political affairs

104. Pillar I would be headed by a Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs. The tasks of the pillar would be as follows:

(a) Monitoring, analysing and reporting on the overall political and human rights situation and status of implementation of the Bonn Agreement, especially as related to the environment for the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*;

(b) Supporting the work of the Special Independent Commission for the Emergency *loya jirga*;

(c) Maintaining contact with Afghan leaders, political parties, civil society groups, institutions and representatives of the central authorities;

(d) Maintaining contact with representatives of the international community;

(e) Performing good offices as necessary on behalf of the Special Representative and in support of the efforts of the legitimate Afghan authorities, particularly in the fields of conflict control, confidence-building and reconciliation;

(f) Providing information and guidance on political issues for the benefit of other UNAMA activities;

(g) Investigating human rights violations and, where necessary, recommending corrective action.

105. In the initial phase, pillar I would consist of approximately 30 to 40 international political/civil affairs officers, based at mission headquarters in Kabul and deployed in small teams (of up to four officers) to each of the seven regions. The international political/civil affairs officers in the regions would be supported by teams of national staff, who would assist in maintaining contact at the district and local levels throughout the country. The existing political and civil affairs capacity of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan would be absorbed into this pillar, immediately upon the establishment of UNAMA.

F. Pillar II: relief, recovery and reconstruction

106. Pillar II of UNAMA would be headed by a Deputy Special Representative for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction, who would perform the functions of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, as well as being the designated official responsible for the security of United Nations personnel in Afghanistan. The Deputy Special Representative would be responsible for the direction and oversight of United Nations relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, including the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and of the offices, agencies, funds and programmes undertaking those activities. The Deputy Special Representative would coordinate an integrated and principled United Nations assistance programme that both informed and was informed by the political and civil affairs work conducted under pillar I. The Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General would ensure a strategic partnership with the Interim Administration

and with the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority in particular, and would directly assist the Administration in articulating a national development framework and in coordinating international assistance to ensure that such assistance was strategically targeted and supportive of immediate and longer-term national priorities.

107. The tasks of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction, in overseeing pillar II, would be:

(a) To articulate a strategic vision for the United Nations assistance role in Afghanistan that responds to the immediate needs of the most vulnerable populations, is supportive of national recovery and reconstruction priorities and is rights-based and gender-sensitive;

(b) To develop an integrated United Nations assistance programme that builds on the comparative advantages, capacities, experience and mandates of the United Nations assistance community to monitor performance and to ensure accountability against established standards of performance, giving special attention to measures promoting women's rights and the achievement of the rights of the most disadvantaged and underserved populations and ethnic groups;

(c) To ensure that United Nations assistance supports capacity-building in counterpart Afghan administrations and organizations at the national and subnational levels to develop policy-making, planning, management, assessment and coordination capabilities. To achieve this goal, all United Nations entities would be expected to provide technical, material and financial support to counterpart administration departments;

(d) To create, with the Interim Administration and other partners, an effective programme information and data management system that builds on the Afghanistan Information Management Service to provide necessary information, in a user-friendly form, on programme coverage, performance and financing, through a range of communication channels, to actors at the national and subnational levels and to donors and partners in the international community. The information and data management facility would be a semi-autonomous United Nations-funded facility, managed by a client board (Interim Authority, United Nations, non-governmental organization and donor

representation) co-located with the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority;

(e) To ensure that the national and subnational activities of United Nations offices, agencies, funds and programmes are conducted efficiently, cost-effectively, in a coordinated manner and in cooperation with other actors — governmental, non-governmental, private sector and international — as appropriate. All such United Nations actors would be expected to make a transition to a predominant reliance on qualified national personnel, from all ethnic groups and including women, and would be expected to initiate internal capacity-development activities to achieve that end. Efforts would also be made to reduce overhead and to ensure the application of common services, systems and facilities wherever possible;

(f) To assign, in agreement with the national administration, thematic and sectoral lead coordination responsibilities to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, as appropriate, which would support counterpart departments to oversee and coordinate all actors — national and international — and activities in each sector, to ensure actions that are coherent and responsive to needs, problems and change, to ensure standardized monitoring and reporting on progress and performance against established targets and standards of performance and to ensure regular information flows between actors, the administration and the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

(g) To oversee, guide and support regional relief, recovery and reconstruction coordinators in the regional UNAMA offices, enabling them to ensure coherent United Nations agency capacity-development support to local counterpart authorities and other partners, to ensure cross-sectoral coordination and problem solving, to monitor and report on United Nations thematic and sectoral activities, to ensure two-way information flows between the capital and peripheral locations and to ensure mutually supportive interface between pillar I and pillar II activities at the subnational level;

(h) To represent the United Nations assistance community to the international and donor communities, to ensure appropriate integrated reporting on the overall performance of the United Nations assistance community, to ensure timely reporting to United Nations bodies as necessary, to mobilize resources for relief, recovery and rehabilitation programmes, to

support the resource mobilization priorities of the Interim Administration and successor administrations and to manage common emergency trust funds.

108. In the initial phase, pillar II would consist of a total of approximately 50 international personnel, based at mission headquarters in Kabul or in the seven regional offices, and also including up to 10 international staff located in the semi-autonomous information and data management facility mentioned above. Subsequently, some Professional staff may be deployed to the provincial level on a selective basis. The existing functions and capacity of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan would be absorbed into UNAMA, as required, once the new mission was established.

G. Inter-pillar coordination at the regional level

109. While my Special Representative and his Director of Office/Chief of Staff would ensure inter-pillar coordination at the mission headquarters level, it is equally vital to ensure that all United Nations staff deployed in the regions work together in a fully coordinated and integrated manner. To this end, all UNAMA elements, including all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, shall operate within common regional boundaries and headquarters (which is not presently the case). Moreover, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall designate, based on seniority and experience, either the senior political/civil affairs officer or the senior coordinator of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction in a particular region to concurrently serve as the UNAMA Regional Representative. The Regional Representative's role would be to serve as the senior representative of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the regions, vis-à-vis national and international actors, as well as to ensure inter-pillar cooperation and coordination.

H. Mission support concept for the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

110. The timely creation of a unified mission is key to the support of the mission's operational goals. The creation of an integrated structure would be phased in.

The first step would be the unification of the administrative components of UNSMA and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This would streamline the provision of administrative and logistical support to the core of UNAMA. In addition, current United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan staff and assets would be integrated. Together, these actions would lay the foundation for UNAMA as a unified presence making the greatest use of common services.

111. The mission support component of UNAMA would comprise around 100 international mission support staff, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer at the D-1 level. Once fully deployed, some 50 mission support staff would be based in Kabul, with up to seven mission support staff (including security officers) deployed to each of the seven regional offices. The deployment to the regions would be gradual and phased.

112. Mission support staff must be deployed quickly to ensure that essential capacities are in place and ready to support the expansion of the mission's operations. To maintain the relatively lean structure of the mission, support activities would be provided at the minimum level needed to sustain safe and responsive operations. Mission support capacity would be required, inter alia, to provide a full range of human resources support services to international and local staff; to procure goods and services; to coordinate the engineering work needed to refurbish buildings; and to provide support in areas ranging from communications to finance, transport and logistics, and first-line medical treatment. In cases where the mission support capacity requires enhancement, temporary deployments of small groups of staff from other field missions would be undertaken. Considerable use would be made of air transport to enhance security and flexibility, reduce travelling time, provide a medical evacuation capacity and ease the delivery of humanitarian and developmental assistance. To enhance the provision of medical care, Member States providing medical support to the International Security Assistance Force would be requested to extend medical treatment to UNAMA staff.

113. To enable the mission to make maximum use of local capacities, a training element must be established to promote and develop skills in areas ranging from English language to vehicle and communications equipment servicing. With effective training, the

number of international mission support staff could be reduced as the number of trained Afghan staff increased.

114. UNAMA would make maximum efforts to co-locate staff and resources in both Kabul and the regions. Co-location would facilitate the provision of common services. To assist this effort, the Interim Administration would be called upon to make appropriate buildings available to UNAMA. Those buildings may be renovated, using local labour and materials, for the mission's use. Co-location would also be key to ensuring adequate security for staff. In this regard, a comprehensive plan will be developed to address the requirements for both office and living accommodations.

115. The detailed needs assessment and preparation of budgetary estimates will proceed as the mission is being established. This will entail coordination with other agencies.

VII. Observations

116. Afghanistan is a shattered society. The participants in the Bonn Conference have set for the leaders and people of their country the formidable challenge of consolidating the peace process in less than three years. But it will take much more than 36 months to heal the wounds left by 23 years of war. The process of healing has started, however, and Afghans and members of the international community must be careful not to allow that process to reverse itself. This requires from all a continued commitment and determination to stay the course. It also requires that realistic and achievable objectives be set. Afghanistan is a desperately poor country, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. However, it now has the chance at least to be a country at peace with its neighbours and itself.

117. Few would have imagined in October 2001 that the Taliban regime's collapse could so quickly be followed by the installation of an internationally recognized Interim Administration. This Administration may not have much in the way of material support or finances, but in the less than three months of its existence its ministers are regularly meeting and discussing issues, making decisions and, under the leadership of Chairman Karzai, very ably representing Afghanistan on the world stage.

118. The Interim Administration has already established sufficient international credibility and

legitimacy that donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations alike are firmly committed to following its lead in helping to administer life-saving assistance, restore basic services around the country and work towards formulating a national development framework.

119. Boys and girls are at last returning to school by the hundreds of thousands. Women, who have been denied fundamental and basic needs, are being employed by international organizations, government ministries, hospitals, schools, and even, in small numbers, the police. The pace of such employment is far from ideal, and much remains to be done, including exercising vigilance and monitoring constantly to ensure that women's rights are not ignored or neglected. At the same time, the present situation stands in stark contrast to the conditions that existed less than six months ago.

120. Notwithstanding the fact that Afghanistan's infrastructure has been destroyed and its people devastated by almost a quarter-century of war, Afghans from all walks of life stand ready to assume responsibility themselves for rebuilding their country. There are millions of Afghans, within the country and in the diaspora, who are educated, capable, motivated and willing to face the challenges ahead. They now need the international community's material and financial assistance to get on with the job, free from the external interference that has undermined Afghanistan's sovereignty for far too long. In this regard, I urge donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to significantly expedite funding and programme delivery so that the benefits of peace may be visible to all concerned immediately, and that the domestic credibility of the Interim Administration can be extended throughout the country — especially outside of Kabul.

121. A critical turning point in the peace process will be the convening of the emergency *loya jirga*, which must occur before 22 June 2002, according to the provisions of the Bonn Agreement. That will be a major political event, and soon political jockeying will start among all political actors, including the old guard as well as military commanders and civil society. It is vitally important that the legitimate political aspirations of individuals and groups be pursued peacefully, constructively and in free and fair conditions, so as not to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the process. To that end, it is equally

important that peace be preserved, and for that to happen the people of Afghanistan must mobilize their efforts, and the international community must remain fully engaged and supportive. Any prospective troublemakers must be made to realize that they will find no sympathy at home and no support abroad.

122. If the emergency *loya jirga* can be successfully convened as scheduled, and if the Transitional Administration selected by the *loya jirga* can be peacefully installed and domestically accepted thereafter, then the risk of a resumption of war should be greatly reduced.

123. Unfortunately, risks to the peace process remain ever-present today. The recent round of fighting between the coalition forces and al-Qa`idah and Taliban fighters in the south-eastern region brings to the forefront a number of fundamental questions. How many al-Qa`idah and Taliban fighters are still in Afghanistan? How strong is their determination to continue to fight a losing battle? Who is helping them, and why? Where are those who left Afghanistan and how many are they? What are their plans? And, more to the point within the context of the present report, what threat do al-Qa`idah members remaining in Afghanistan and their supporters pose to the peace process? While answers to some of these questions may remain elusive, they cannot be wished away. It is for this reason that the peace process must be consolidated and the authority of the central government extended to all parts of the country. The only way to ensure the eradication of terrorism from Afghan soil is by empowering the countries' legitimate authorities to police their own territory.

124. Sadly, the risks to the peace process do not come only from terrorist groups. As a consequence of decades of war, mutual suspicion and mistrust continue to exist between old rivals. All must be made to understand that the only option in the new Afghanistan is patient and tolerant work to establish mutual trust and confidence so that all disputes are resolved through compromise and other peaceful means.

125. Let me further remind all concerned of the dynamics that plunged Afghanistan back into war in 1992. Where the symptoms of that bitter past have emerged, they must be dealt with rapidly. Where they have not emerged, they must not be allowed to do so. This is particularly the case in the capital, where the successful installation of the Interim Administration

and the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force have helped to improve the situation dramatically. But even here there should be no room for complacency.

126. Security is and will remain the essential requirement for the protection of the peace process. Consequently, the Afghans are unanimous in considering security as their first and most important need. This view is reflected by Chairman Karzai, who has repeatedly called for the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force to other parts of the country. Afghans and most close observers of the Afghan political scene are confident that such a geographic expansion to a number of major urban centres would significantly minimize the likelihood of large-scale hostilities erupting again between existing armed factions.

127. I cannot emphasize enough that, whatever form of security assistance the Security Council and Member States should decide to provide to Afghanistan at this, its hour of need, speed is of the essence.

128. Speed is of the essence, too, in helping to build the indigenous security sector — in particular the Afghan military and civilian police forces. Without a credible national security apparatus in the short and longer term, all that has been achieved to date could unravel quickly. Moreover, without security today, the billions of dollars pledged for Afghanistan's reconstruction will be of little use tomorrow.

129. The proposed mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, under the leadership of my Special Representative, is intended to ensure that all forms of United Nations assistance — political, human rights and rule of law, gender, relief, recovery and reconstruction — are channelled towards supporting the implementation of the peace process by the Afghan people. The proposed structure and size of the mission is relatively lean. This is precisely so that the Organization's overhead costs do not consume too much of the overall aid destined for the people of Afghanistan, and so that the presence of too many international staff does not overwhelm the nascent Interim Administration by creating conflicting demands.

130. However, UNAMA will not be able to carry out its functions effectively unless the security situation is addressed immediately. This responsibility lies with Member States that are in a position to lend the

necessary assistance and that have the means to do so. Countries around the world have stated that, this time, they will not abandon the people of Afghanistan. The opportunity now presents itself for them to show the Afghans that they mean what they say.

131. Likewise, Afghan leaders must not forget that donors and troop contributors will be more receptive to appeals for assistance if they are convinced that Afghans are doing as much as they can to help themselves. On this note, I urge Afghan leaders to recognize that dialogue and compromise with political rivals does not require financial assistance from the international community. It requires nothing less and nothing more than the will and the courage to transcend ethnic and regional parochialism in favour of genuine national unity and lasting peace.
